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Abstract. In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian
solution. The single axiom sufficient for characterization is a new condition which we call
symmetric decomposition.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Nash (1950) on cooperative bargaining theory, a volu-
minous number of bargaining solutions have been proposed and axiomatized in the
literature. Among the solutions that have been most studied is the egalitarian solu-
tion which was recommended by Rawls (1971). Given a bargaining problem faced by
individuals in the society, this solution implies maximization of the utility of the worst-
off individual over the bargaining set. A characterization of the egalitarian solution
when the number of individuals is fixed and the bargaining set is convex, compact, and
comprehensive was proposed by Kalai (1977) using symmetry, weak Pareto optimality,
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and strong monotonicity conditions. Symmetry axiom says that if the bargaining set is
invariant under all exchanges of agents, then the solution must be invariant too. Weak
Pareto optimality requires that all gains from cooperation should be weakly exhausted,
whereas strong monotonicity demands that all agents should benefit from any expan-
sion of the bargaining set. Kalai (1977) also shows that strong monotonicity condition
can be replaced by step-by-step negotiation, a decomposability condition which says
that if the bargaining set expands from U to S, the solution on S can be calculated by
first finding the solution on U (step 1) and then adding it to the solution on the set of
individually rational options in S with respect to the solution in step 1.
In this paper, we propose a simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution in
the same bargaining domain as studied by Kalai (1977). We show that the n-person
egalitarian solution is the only bargaining solution that satisfies a new condition which
we call symmetric decomposition.
A number of studies in the literature have axiomatized the egalitarian solution in
alternative domains of bargaining problems. As such, Thomson (1983a, 1984) consider
bargaining problems where the number of bargaining individuals may vary, Conley and
Wilkie (2000) relax the restriction that the bargaining set is convex, Rachmilevitch
(2011) considers a restricted domain where the bargaining set is strictly comprehensive,
and Conley and Wilkie (2012) study domains where the bargaining set is finite. There
are also other studies that consider the characterization of related solutions, such as the
lexicographic egalitarian solution and proportional solutions. See, for example, Myerson
(1977), Roth (1979), Myerson and Thomson (1980), Myerson (1981), Thomson (1983b),
and Chun and Thomson (1990).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic structures
and in Section 3 we present our characterization result. Finally, Section 4 contains
some concluding remarks.
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2 Basic Structures
We consider a society with the set of individuals N = {1, 2, ..., n}. A bargaining
problem for this society consists of a pair (S, d) where S is a non-empty subset of Rn+
and d ∈ S. Here, S represents von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities attainable through
the cooperative actions of n individuals. If the individuals fail to agree on an outcome
in S, then the bargaining is settled at the point d, which is called the disagreement
point. In this paper, we consider the domain Σn of bargaining problems where
(a) S is convex and compact, and there exists x ∈ S such that x > d.1
(b) S is d-comprehensive; i.e., if x ∈ S, y ∈ Rn+, x ≥ y ≥ d and x 6= y then y ∈ S
(the possibility of free disposal of utility).
We define the weak Pareto set of S as
WP (S) = {x ∈ S | y > x implies y /∈ S}
and the strong Pareto set of S as
P (S) = {x ∈ S | y ≥ x and y 6= x implies y /∈ S}.
A solution F is a mapping from Σn to Rn+ such that for each (S, d) ∈ Σn, F (S, d) ∈ S.
The egalitarian solution maps each bargaining problem (S, d) ∈ Σn to the point E(S, d)
of WP (S) such that Ei(S, d)− di = Ej(S, d)− dj for all i, j ∈ N .
Given a bargaining problem (S, d), we denote by aj(S, d) the maximal net utility
attainable by agent j ∈ N ; i.e., aj(S, d) = maxx∈S(xj − dj). For any real β ∈ (0, 1], we
define the reference point c(S, d, β) ∈ S such that ci(S, d, β) = di + βminj∈N aj(S, d)/2
for all i ∈ N . Clearly, c(S, d, 1) − d is the symmetric point in the Pareto frontier
of the convex hull of the set of vectors v1, v2, . . . , vn where for each k ∈ N , vkk =
minj∈N aj(S, d) and vkl = 0 for each l ∈ N\{k}.
1Given two vectors x and y in Rn+, x ≥ y means xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x > y means xi > yi for
all i ∈ N .
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Given a bargaining problem (S, d), we denote by IR(S, d) the individually rational
allocations; i.e., IR(S, d) = {x ∈ S | d ≤ x}. For any bargaining set S ⊂ Rn+ and
any z ∈ Rn+ we define S − z = {x ∈ Rn | ∃ y ∈ S such that x = y − z}. Apparently,
IR(S, c(S, d, β)) − c(S, d, β) = IR(S − c(S, d, β), 0) ∈ Σn for any (S, d) ∈ Σn and for
any β ∈ (0, 1]. In Fig. 1, we plot a 2-person bargaining problem with β = 1.
Agent 1
Agent 2
45°
●
E(S,d)
a2(S,d)
S
a1(S,d)
d ●
●
c(S,d,1)
IR(S,d)
IR(S,c(S,d,1))
90°
(0,0)
●
Fig. 1
We investigate the existence of solutions satisfying the following new axiom:
Symmetric decomposition. There exists β ∈ (0, 1] such that F (S, d) = c(S, d, β) +
F (IR(S − c(S, d, β), 0), 0) for all (S, d) ∈ Σn.
The above axiom says that the solution F (S, d) can be calculated in two steps, by
first obtaining, for some β ∈ (0, 1], the symmetric reference point c(S, d, β) in S and
then taking it to be the starting point for the distribution of the utilities in S.
4
3 Characterization Result
Theorem 1. A solution satisfies symmetric decomposition if and only if it is the
egalitarian solution.
Proof. It is clear that the egalitarian solution satisfies symmetric decomposition since
for all β ∈ (0, 1] we have E(S, d) = c(S, d, β) + E(IR(S − c(S, d, β), 0), 0) for all
(S, d) ∈ Σn. Conversely, let F be a solution on Σn satisfying symmetric decomposition.
First, pick any β ∈ (0, 1] such that F (S, d) = c(S, d, β) + F (IR(S − c(S, d, β), 0), 0)
for all (S, d) ∈ Σn, and then pick any (S, d) ∈ Σn. Consider the sequence of
bargaining problems (St, dt)∞t=0 where S
0 = S, d0 = d, and dt = 0 and St =
IR(St−1 − c(St−1, dt−1, β), 0) for each integer t ≥ 1. We say that agent k deter-
mines the reference point c(S˜, d˜, β) in a given bargaining problem (S˜, d˜) ∈ Σn if
k = min{i ∈ N | i = argminj∈N aj(S˜, d˜)}. Then, for any integer m ≥ 0, there must
exist an agent, say k(m), determining the reference point in at least m + 1 of the
first nm + 1 problems in the sequence (St, dt)∞t=0. For each integer m ≥ 0, we de-
note by (St, dt)t∈{t1,t2,...,tm+1} the first m+ 1 problems in which agent k(m) determines
the reference point. Clearly, we have ak(m)(S
ti+1 , dti+1) ≤ (1 − β
2
)ak(m)(S
ti , dti) for
all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} for each integer m ≥ 0. Using the fact that ak(m)(St1 , dt1) ≤
ak(m)(S
0, d0), we have ak(m)(S
tm+1 , dtm+1) ≤ (1 − β
2
)mak(m)(S
0, d0) for each integer
m ≥ 0. Now suppose that F (S0, d0) 6= E(S0, d0). Pick any integer mˆ such that
(1− β
2
)mˆak(mˆ)(S
0, d0) < |Fk(mˆ)(S0, d0)−minj∈N Fj(S0, d0)|. Then ak(mˆ)(Stmˆ+1 , dtmˆ+1) <
|Fk(mˆ)(S0, d0)−minj∈N Fj(S0, d0)| and therefore F (S0, d0)−
∑tmˆ
τ=1 c(S
τ , dτ , β) /∈ Stmˆ+1 .
However, we have F (St+1, dt+1) = F (S0, d0)−∑tτ=1 c(Sτ , dτ , β) for all integer t ≥ 0 by
symmetric decomposition. This implies that F (Stmˆ+1 , dtmˆ+1) /∈ Stmˆ+1 , a contradiction.
Therefore, F (S0, d0) = E(S0, d0). Since (S0, d0) = (S, d) ∈ Σn was arbitrarily picked,
F must be equal to the the egalitarian solution on Σn. 
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have considered an alternative characterization of the egalitarian
solution in a class of bargaining problems with convex, compact and comprehensive
bargaining sets. We show that the n-person egalitarian solution is the only bargaining
solution that satisfies a new condition which we call symmetric decomposition. This sin-
gle condition replaces the three conditions in a characterization result of Kalai (1977),
step-by-step negotiation, symmetry and weak Pareto optimality. Dropping symmetry in
Kalai (1977), any n-person weighted egalitarian solution (n-person proportional solu-
tion) with weights α in the n− 1 dimensional simplex, selecting the maximal point of
the bargaining set in the direction of α also become admissible. Alternatively, dropping
weak Pareto optimality in the characterization result of Kalai (1977), any n-person con-
tracted egalitarian solution with the contraction factor in [0, 1] also become admissible.
The reason why the decomposition condition of ours successfully strengthens that
of Kalai (1977) is that given any bargaining problem (S, 0), step-by-step negotiation
requires any bargaining solution F to be decomposable with regard to the reference
point F (T, 0) for each T ⊆ S, whereas symmetric decomposition requires the decom-
posability, for some β ∈ (0, 1], only with regard to the symmetric point c(T, 0, β) of the
greatest symmetric and strictly comprehensive set T contained by S such that T has
a linear Pareto frontier. Thus, the reference point in our case is proportional to the
egalitarian solution on T ; i.e., c(T, 0, β) = βE(T, 0), where β ∈ (0, 1]. Since it is true
that βE(T, 0) = E(βT, 0) for any β ∈ (0, 1], the reference point we use in our charac-
terization is the symmetric and weakly Pareto optimal point in βT for our particular
choice of T . Indeed, what eliminate the admissibility of any n-person contracted, non-
egalitarian proportional solution in the sole presence of decomposability are entirely
the notions of symmetry and weak Pareto optimality embedded in our decomposition
condition.
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